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Implementing second-best environmental policy under adverse
selection
Abstract
A key obstacle to practical application of mechanism design theory in regulation is the
diﬃculty of obtaining consistent beliefs regarding information assumed to be commonly
held in the models. This paper presents a solution to this problem by developing an easily-
implemented empirical methodology with which the government can use commonly available
data to develop beliefs regarding the technology and distribution of types in a regulated sec-
tor characterized by hidden information. Results are used to calibrate a second-best land
conservation mechanism and evaluate its cost relative to simpler alternatives.




The normative theoretical literature on optimal regulation under adverse selection has
grown tremendously in the past three decades. In spite of this progress, actual policies
implementing even the most basic optimal mechanisms remain scarce. One obstacle to
the transition from theory to practice is the diﬃculty of obtaining information that the
theoretical models assume to be commonly held. Models typically characterize a second-best
(as opposed to the full information first-best) menu of contracts stipulating payments and
allocations among which the regulated firms choose. The precise terms of each contract
are defined up to commonly held beliefs regarding: a) firms’ production technology; and
b) the probability distribution of firm types.1 The optimal values of the contract terms
can vary greatly depending on these two sets of beliefs. From the standpoint of applied
theory, the development of consistent beliefs regarding these items is therefore of paramount
importance. How to develop these beliefs given readily available information (e.g., from
industrial surveys) is an issue on which the literature has largely remained silent.
This paper shows how to calculate the terms of a second-best mechanism bymodeling type
as a source of heterogeneity that is unobserved both to the regulator and the econometrician.
Such a methodology has a wide range of potential applications for general principal-agent
problems characterized by adverse selection. It is particularly relevant in regulatory appli-
cations that fit into the general framework of Baron and Myerson (1982). With respect to
environmental policy, this framework readily applies to cases in which environmental benefits
are privately provided or in which firms have an eﬀective right (e.g., for legal or political
reasons) to pollute.
As a concrete application, I consider the problem of designing a program to encourage
1Type refers to a productivity parameter that is private information to each firm.
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landowners to set aside environmentally-sensitive land from production. Such conserva-
tion payments programs are becoming popular in both the developed and developing world.
Prominent examples include the Wetlands Reserve Program and Conservation Reserve Pro-
gram (CRP) in the United States and Costa Rica’s Pago de Servicios Ambientales (payment
for environmental services) program. Such programs share the characteristics that partic-
ipation is voluntary, and that opportunity costs of participation (i.e., foregone profit) are
both heterogeneous across landowners and not directly observable to the government.
There are several policy instruments available to the government for meeting a given
land set aside target. The choice of instrument involves a trade-oﬀ between simplicity and
cost-eﬀectiveness. At one extreme is a single Pigouvian subsidy. This instrument is simple
to administer, but involves potentially large excess payments to landowners with low partic-
ipation costs. At the other extreme is first-degree price discrimination. This instrument is
diﬃcult to implement. It requires the government to obtain perfect information regarding
costs and to design a contract tailored to each landowner. It is cost eﬀective, however, since
it results in an eﬃcient allocation with each owner receiving a payment exactly equaling his
opportunity cost. Between these extremes lie third-degree price discrimination (geographi-
cally diﬀerentiated Pigouvian subsidies) and second-degree price discrimination (the Baron
and Myerson mechanism).
Theory can rank these instruments by expected cost. With the empirical tools provided
in this paper, however, one can go a step further towards making an informed choice between
instruments based on the magnitude of cost diﬀerences. Such analysis also contributes to
the discussion in the mechanism design literature surrounding the “Wilson doctrine.” In
an influential piece, Wilson (1987) noted the prevalence of simple rather than theoretically
optimal trading rules in markets with asymmetric information. As noted above, the terms of
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a second-best contract mechanism are highly dependent upon the regulator’s beliefs regarding
the production technology and distribution of types. In contrast, some mechanisms (like
Pigouvian instruments and some types of auctions) are always allocatively eﬃcient, even if
they do not optimize the regulator’s objective. Proponents of the Wilson doctrine argue
that such mechanisms (which also have the virtue of simplicity) are therefore preferable to
a complicated mechanism that is optimal only if the regulator’s beliefs are correct. The
analysis illustrated here provides policy-makers an easily implementable means of evaluating
the magnitude of potential gains oﬀered by theoretically optimal mechanisms.
To identify both the production technology and the distribution of types, the empirical
methodology uses a two-part additive error structure in the spirit of the stochastic frontier
models pioneered by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). One
part of the error is stochastic noise, while the other represents type. This econometric model
extends the stochastic frontier literature by adapting robust generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation techniques recently developed in other contexts.
Previous research attempting to identify the production technology and distribution of
types under adverse selection can be divided into two branches. One branch of the empirical
contract theory literature, such as Wolak (1994), Thomas (1995), and Lavergne and Thomas
(2005) assumes that existing regulations are optimal in a second-best sense. The optimality
conditions provide equations that can be econometrically estimated with observable data.
Regression results allow the econometrician to infer the regulator’s beliefs regarding the
distribution of types and the technology. By its nature, this line of research is descriptive
rather than prescriptive. It may describe the regulator’s beliefs regarding the commonly held
information. However, it provides no guidance to the regulator as to how she might develop
them in the first place.
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A second branch of the literature deals with how to estimate the actual distribution of
types rather than the regulator’s beliefs. In initial work along this line, Dalen and Gómez-
Lobo (1997) interpret regression residuals as firm types for a model of urban transport. The
model is rather restrictive since it does not allow for any random error. A more flexible
approach allows for both random types and stochastic noise. Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997)
and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) use such an approach in their studies of French telecommu-
nications and urban transport. They assume parametric distributions for both unobserved
variables. Maximum likelihood techniques allow estimation of the parameters of the relevant
value functions and probability distributions.
By allowing for both random error and unobserved types, Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997)
and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) are the works most closely related to this paper. The
methodology presented here has three principal advantages over earlier approaches. First, as
pointed out by Kopp and Mullahy (1990), a disadvantage to using the maximum likelihood
approach often employed in stochastic frontier analysis is that parameter estimates are in-
consistent in the presence of errors that are not i.i.d. The approach developed here is robust
to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and geographic clustering. Second, these papers estimated
a single equation. In a framework with two unobserved sources of variation, deriving and
estimating the likelihood function for a joint system of several equations with potentially
correlated errors becomes quite cumbersome, and to my knowledge has not been done.2 In
contrast, the framework employed here easily allows one to increase estimation eﬃciency by
using a system of cost function and expenditure share equations. Finally, this approach is
easily implementable with cross-sectional data, and is computationally undemanding.
2Current techniques for maximum likelihood estimation of stochastic frontier systems require the assump-
tion that the error term in the cost frontier equation is independent of the error terms in the expenditure
share equations for the same observation (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I create a formal
theoretical model of the four policy options for setting aside land. In Section 3, I develop and
implement the econometric strategy for obtaining consistent beliefs regarding the production
technology and distribution of agent types for a sample of Midwestern U.S. farmers. In
Section 4, I use this information to calibrate a simulation evaluating the relative costs of the
various land set aside policies. Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2 Alternative Contract Schemes
I consider four versions of a program designed to induce landowners to remove land from
production. In all versions, the program has two salient features. First, the government
must ensure that the sector idles a targeted quantity of land. Second, the program must be
voluntary. The regulator’s objective is to allocate set asides and transfer payments to each
landowner that minimize the expected cost of satisfying the constraints.
The basic theoretical model builds upon earlier work by Smith (1995) and Crépin (2005).
Landowners can be diﬀerentiated by observable characteristics that depend on a general
geographical location (referred to as their county), indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., I}. In a given
county landowners are assumed to be identical up to an unobserved (to the government)
productivity parameter θ ∈ (0, 1], referred to as their type. Let f (θ) ≡ dF (θ) /dθ denote
the government’s beliefs regarding the probability density function of types, assumed to
be the same for all counties. This function satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition:
d [F (θ) /f (θ)] /dθ > 0.3
Let a denote the amount of land idled by an individual. The restricted profit function
3This assumption is standard in mechanism design theory. It is satisfied by a wide range of common
distributions (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005).
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ri (a, θ), indicates the market income obtained from the unenrolled land.4 It completely
characterizes the production technology. This function satisfies riθ > 0, r
i
a < 0, r
i
aa < 0, r
i
aθ <
0, and riaaθ < 0.
5 The first property indicates that θ increases productivity. The next
indicates that enrolling land reduces profit. The third property shows that this marginal
opportunity cost becomes greater in absolute value as enrollment increases (least productive
land is enrolled first). The fourth property, commonly referred to as the single-crossing
condition, indicates that the marginal opportunity cost is increasing in type (all else equal,
more productive landowners forego more profit from idling an additional acre). The final
property is a regularity condition that helps ensure that the second-best problem is well
behaved.
The pair hai (θ) , ti (θ)i denotes contract terms in county i for type θ, where ai (θ) is the
amount of land enrolled in the program and ti (θ) is the transfer payment. The environmental










Here, A is a parameter indicating the average acreage idled per landowner, and ni is the
number of landowners in county i. Maximum enrollment for any individual is constrained
by his total available acreage
ai (θ) ≤ a¯i ∀ θ, i, (2)
where a¯i is the size of a holding in county i. Let λ ≥ 0 and γ (θ) ≥ 0 respectively denote the
Lagrange multipliers for (1) and (2).
4Output price is assumed to be perfectly elastic so that a landowner’s profit is not aﬀected by the amount
of land idled by others.
5As a notational convention, subscripts on functions denote partial derivatives and superscripts denote
county indexes.
8
The second policy constraint is that program participation be voluntary. As a result, the
regulator must compensate landowners for at least their opportunity cost:
ti (θ) ≥ ri (0, θ)− ri
¡
ai (θ) , θ
¢
, ∀ θ, i. (3)
Define surplus payments received in excess of the minimum necessary to satisfy (3) by:
si (θ) ≡ ti (θ)−
£
ri (0, θ)− ri
¡
ai (θ) , θ
¢¤
. (4)
The voluntary participation constraint (3) can then be expressed more succinctly as:
si (θ) ≥ 0, ∀ θ, i. (5)








si (θ) + ri (0, θ)− ri
¡
ai (θ) , θ
¢¤
dF (θ) . (6)
The policy alternatives in the following subsections progress from least to most constrained.
The first-best allows the government to allocate transfers and payments across types as it sees
fit, subject only to constraints (1), (2), and (5). The second-best adds the constraint that the
allocation must be incentive compatible. The county-level Pigouvian subsidy requires that
the same per-acre payment be oﬀered to all landowners in a given county, with participation
levels determined by each individual. Since this system is necessarily incentive compatible,
it is more constrained than the second-best. The last alternative adds the constraint that
a single per-acre payment be oﬀered to all landowners, regardless of location. Therefore,
the cost of attaining the land set aside target cannot be decreasing as we progress from
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one alternative to the next. The magnitude of any possible increase in cost is the empirical
question to be addressed in Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 First-Best (First-Degree Price Discrimination)








si (θ) + ri (0, θ)− ri
¡









a¯i − ai (θ)
¤o
dF (θ)
subject to surplus constraint (5). Since surplus payments only increase cost, this constraint
binds for all types. The first-best land allocation also satisfies the following Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for all i and θ:
ria
¡























dF (θ) = γi (θ)
£
a¯i − ai (θ)
¤
= 0. (10)
Consequently, for an interior solution in which neither county nor individual acreage restric-
tions bind, the optimal first-best program satisfies the equimarginal principle. It equates the
marginal profit from cultivating an additional acre of land for each landowner to the shadow
cost of tightening the environmental constraint for the entire sector. The first-best program
could be implemented with a two-part tariﬀ. The regulator would oﬀer a uniform subsidy for
idled land equal to the shadow value of the enrollment target. Landowners would respond
by idling the eﬃcient quantity of land. A type-dependent lump-sum tax would recover all
10
surplus payments arising from the subsidy.
2.2 Second-Best (Second-Degree Price Discrimination)
The optimal second-best policy is slightly more complicated. The Revelation Principle
(e.g., Myerson, 1979) indicates that there is no loss in generality by restricting attention
to direct revelation mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility. Incentive compatibility





















This requirement, combined with the participation constraint (5), imposes two restrictions
on the set of feasible contract allocations (both follow directly from results in Baron and










ai (θ) , θ
¢
− riθ (0, θ) . (13)
Intuitively, if the government oﬀered payments to exactly oﬀset opportunity costs, low types
would choose contracts designed for higher types (but not vice versa). Therefore, the lower
the type, the higher the surplus payment necessary to induce a landowner to choose the
contract intended for him.
Since surplus is non-increasing, the best the principal can do while satisfying (5) and (13)
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riθ (0, ω)− riθ
¡
ai (ω) , ω
¢¤
dω. (14)
Temporarily ignoring (12), substitution of Eq. (14) into Eq. (6) and integrating by parts











riθ (0, θ)− riθ
¡
ai (θ) , θ
¢¤
+ ri (0, θ)− ri
¡









a¯i − ai (θ)
¤o
dF (θ) .
The second-best land allocation satisfies the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
ria
¡
ai (θ) , θ
¢
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dF (θ) = γi (θ)
£
a¯i − ai (θ)
¤
= 0. (18)
The restrictions on F (θ) and ri (·) ensure that this solution satisfies (12) (see Guesnerie and
Laﬀont, 1984).
The impact of asymmetric information can be easily seen for interior solutions. Unlike
the first-best case, rather than having the marginal profit of land be equated for all farms,
there is a distortion created by the term F (θ) riaθ/f (θ) in Eq. (16). As a result, the equimar-
ginal principal is never satisfied. This program could be implemented by the government
requesting that landowners choose a contract from a menu of possible choices. Alternatively,
the second-best welfare level can be thought of as an upper bound of the welfare obtainable
by an optimally designed procurement auction. For an interior solution, the second-best is
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not obtainable by a Pigouvian subsidy.
2.3 Diﬀerentiated Pigouvian Subsidy (Third-Degree Price Discrimination)
This program is also geographically diﬀerentiated inasmuch as a distinct payment scheme
can be applied to each county. Unlike the previous case, however, transfers are restricted to
be the product of per-acre Pigouvian subsidy τ i and enrolled acres (i.e., ti (θ) ≡ τ iai (θ)).




ai (θ) , θ
¢
= τ i. (19)
Presented with this subsidy, the solution the landowners’ optimal enrollment problem is:
a˜i (τ , θ) ≡ argmax
a
©
ri (a, θ) + τ ia
ª
.
Knowing this, the government’s optimization problem is to choose the vector τ ≡
¡
τ 1, ..., τ I
¢





















































6As in the standard monopsonist problem, it is necessary to verify satisfaction of the second order

















The intuition behind this result is easiest understood for interior solutions in which the
optimal τ i is strictly positive and constraint (2) does not bind. Then, Eq. (21) can be re-
arranged to yield a variant of the inverse-elasticity pricing rule for a monopsonist that can


















a˜i (τ i, θ) dF (θ)
(24)
is the price elasticity of expected supply of enrolled acreage in county i. The government
minimizes cost by providing a higher subsidy in counties with more elastic supply.
2.4 Single Pigouvian Subsidy (No Price Discrimination)
The single Pigouvian subsidy is similar to the case analyzed in the previous section, with
the exception that all τ i must share the same value. Therefore, when landowners respond to
the subsidy, for an interior solution the Pigouvian land allocation equates marginal returns to
land (just like the first best). Moreover, in order to satisfy the environmental constraint (1),
this land allocation must be exactly the same as for the first-best program (i.e., equal to the
shadow value of enrolled land). Unlike the first-best, however, the information asymmetry
prevents the use of a two-part tariﬀ to recover surplus payments. The best it can do is ensure
that the highest participating type receive zero surplus.
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3 Empirical Model
In this section, I show how one can estimate the parameters of the production technology
and the distribution function of agent types using commonly available data (e.g., from cross-
sectional industrial surveys). These results provide the necessary information to calibrate
the allocations for the policy alternatives described above. I begin by specifying a para-
metric technology. This technology implies a cost function, expenditure share equations (by
Shephard’s Lemma), and a revenue to cost ratio (by profit maximization). I then show how
robust GMM techniques can be applied to standard stochastic frontier analysis for eﬃcient
estimation of this system of equations.
3.1 Specification
Since the Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) stochastic frontier
models employ log-linear econometric models, the presence of negative observed profit in the
data makes it is more convenient to work with the cost function rather than the restricted
profit function directly. Once the parameters of the cost function are estimated, one can
use them to recover the profit function. Let C (w, q, c, θ) denote the minimum cost for a
type θ to produce q ∈ <+ units of an aggregate agricultural commodity, given a vector of
variable input prices w ≡ (w1, ..., wN) ∈ <N++ and a land endowment c ∈ <+.7 I assume this
cost function has a Cobb-Douglas form in which a reduction in type indicates a proportional
increase in cost:










7For regression variables and parameters, subscripts represent indexes.
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Here, s ≡ (s1, ..., sM)0 is a vector of publicly observable factors aﬀecting cost. These variables
include year and state fixed eﬀects to control for region-wide annual shocks and state-level
factors unlikely to have changed significantly in the four-year period. In addition, since corn
is the primary output of the region, s includes county-level mean corn yields as a proxy for
local factors that aﬀect production such as average soil quality and climate characteristics.
Let q∗ ≡ argmax
q
{pq − C (w, q, c, θ)} for a given output price p ∈ <++. Algebraic
manipulation of the first order condition for an interior solution to this profit maximization
problem yields the following equation for the ratio of revenue to cost:
pq∗
C (w, q, c, θ)
=
∂ lnC (w, q, c, 1)
∂ ln q
. (26)
Note that ratio (26) is independent of θ.
Following Diewert (1982), Shephard’s Lemma and Eq. (26) provide a system of equations














+ βq ln q
∗ + βc ln c+ v0 − ln θ (27)
wnxn∗
C
= βn + vn , n = 1, ..., N − 1 (28)
pq∗
C
= βq + vN , (29)
where C is observed cost. The vector of random noise for an individual landowner is v ≡
(v0, v1, ..., vN)
0. Normalization of the cost function bywN imposes positive linear homogeneity
in input prices.
Since output is endogenous under the assumption of profit maximization, the state-level
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annual output price index p acts as an instrument for q∗. In addition, during the period in
which the data were collected (1997-2000), the U.S. government was implementing a land set
aside program (the Conservation Reserve Program). Since farmers were paid to remove land
from production, the amount of land reported as being cultivated was likely correlated with
individuals unobserved productivity characteristics. I therefore employ county population
density as an instrument for c. Finally, as noted by Fuss (1977), individual input price indices
are likely to be endogenous since the component weights (e.g., relative use of diesel versus
gasoline in determining an aggregate energy price) may also be correlated with unobserved
landowner characteristics. To correct for this, I use state-level price indices as instruments
for individual-level prices. The vector z denotes the exogenous variables for an individual
landowner.
Since θ is unobservable to the government and the econometrician, ln θ is modeled as a
component of the error term in Eq. (27).8 Assume that v and θ satisfy the following moment
conditions:
M1. E [v|z] = 0;
M2. E [v30] = 0;
M3. E [ln θ|z] = −σp2/π;
M4. E
£
(ln θ −E [ln θ])3
¤
= σ3 (1− 4/π)
p
2/π.
Under M1, v is a mean-zero disturbance vector uncorrelated with the instruments. In
addition, M2 states that the disturbance for Eq. (27) is symmetrically distributed. Assump-
tions M3 and M4 require that ln θ be uncorrelated with the instruments, and indicate that it
belongs to a “half-normal” distribution (ln θ has the same distribution as − |h|, where h is a
random variable distributed N (0, σ2)). Thus, the distribution of ln θ has a single parameter,
8Type cancels out of Eqs. (28) and (29).
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σ, that determines all its moments.
As noted by Aigner et al. (1977), these distributional assumptions have two practical
implications. First, consider a least squares estimator that ignores the type-dependent com-
ponent of the error structure, using the incorrect moment conditions E [v0 − ln θ|z] = 0.
By treating the expected compound error as mean zero, rather than mean σ
p
2/π, this
regression upwardly biases estimates of coeﬃcients corresponding to the intercept.9 All
other parameter estimates remain consistent. The second practical implication is that the




The assumption of a half-normal distribution for the error component ln θ is common
in the stochastic frontier literature (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Intuitively, it can be
justified by the notion that in a competitive economy the mode of the distribution of firms
should be near the frontier. Since type is unobservable, however, it is impossible to formally
test this structural hypothesis with cross-sectional data. Nonetheless, as depicted in Figure
1, the distribution of county-level average corn yields in the region under study appears to
support the plausibility of this assumption.
Let e ≡ (e1, ..., eJ)0 denote the regression residuals for Eq. (27), where j = 1, .., J indexes
each observation. The third moment of the residuals is a consistent estimator for the third
moment of the combined error term v0− ln θ. This suggests an additional equation that can
9Consider the special case in which s contains only a constant term. Least-squares methods can be
thought of as estimating the following regression:
lnC − lnwN = σ
p
2/π + α +
N−1P
n=1
βn ln w˜n + βq ln q
∗ + βc ln c +
h





Note that the expected value of the error term in brackets is zero, but the presence of the (unobserved) first
term on the right hand side will bias upwards the estimate of α.
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be estimated sequentially after Eqs. (27)-(29):
e3j = −σ3 (1− 4/π)
p
2/π + vj(N+1), (30)
where vj(N+1) is random noise for observation j. The cube root of the estimate σˆ
3 can then
be used to correct the initial bias in the intercept.
Using these results, estimation of the system proceeds in three steps. The first step
consists of ignoring ln θ, and estimating Eqs. (27)-(29) by system two-stage least squares
(2SLS). Let b denote the vector of parameters for Eqs. (27)-(29). The system 2SLS estimator
bˆ2SLS is
bˆ2SLS = (Z0X)−1 (Z0Y) , (31)
where X, Y, and Z are respectively the equation-by-equation stacked right-hand side, left-
hand side, and exogenous variables for all observations for Eqs. (27)-(29). This estimator
is consistent for all parameters, except the intercept. The estimator bˆ2SLS is likely to be
ineﬃcient, however, and generate inconsistent estimates of the covariance matrix. In addition
to correlation of errors for the same observation across equations, the noise component may
be heteroskedastic or influenced by unobserved shocks commonly aﬀecting all landowners in
the same geographic area. Such shocks may be short-lived or persist across time.
The next step addresses these potential problems. Following Pepper (2002), Wooldridge
(2002), and Wooldridge (2003), the 2SLS residuals are used to construct a robust GMM























where superscripts indicate that the respective matrices contain only the information for
county i. Eﬀectively, Ψ is the average of county-level weighting matrices calculated in turn
from farm-level 2SLS residuals (for more details see Wooldridge (2002), pp. 328-330). For
this estimator to be appropriate, I assume that errors from diﬀerent counties are independent,
and unobserved county eﬀects are uncorrelated with the instruments. This estimator is
asymptotically eﬃcient in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary county-
level correlations both within and across time periods.
Finally, the third empirical moment of the GMM residuals from Eq. (27) is used as the
left-hand side variable in Eq. (30). This last equation is then consistently estimated by
ordinary least squares. The estimate σˆ3 is used to compute σ
p
2/π and correct the bias
in the GMM estimate for the intercept. Newey (1984) shows how the residuals from this
sequence of regressions can be used to calculate an asymptotic covariance matrix for the
entire system.
The consistency of estimates of the distribution of agent types and the intercept of the
cost function (but not other parameters) depends upon both the half-normal distribution of
ln θ and the symmetry of v about its mean. Although these are arguably strong assumptions,
they are in fact weaker than those typically employed in stochastic frontier analysis. The
commonly-used maximum likelihood stochastic frontier approach (available for single equa-
tion estimation in several in econometric software packages) adds additional assumptions
regarding the i.i.d. normality of v. As noted by Kopp and Mullahy (1990), estimates of all
parameters in such models are inconsistent if errors are not i.i.d. In addition, estimation of a
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complete stochastic frontier system using maximum-likelihood methods for non-i.i.d. errors
is likely to be computationally unwieldy. To the author’s knowledge this paper is the first to
illustrate how the Pepper-Wooldridge-Newey GMM approach can be used to overcome these
shortcomings in stochastic frontier analysis. The resulting estimator is not only robust, but
computationally undemanding, even with a system of equations.10
3.2 Data and Estimation Results
The empirical analysis is conducted on a sample of midwestern U.S. agricultural produc-
ers. Producer cost and returns data come from 1997-2000 Agricultural Resource Management
Study (ARMS) surveys conducted by the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS). The surveys are independent annual cross-sections in which it is not possible to
track individual producers across time. ARMS contains data on input expenditures, output
quantities, and land. Input and output price data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for capital and labor, the Federal Reserve for interest rates and NASS for other inputs as
well as output commodities. County-level population densities come from the US Census
Bureau website, and county-level corn yields come from the NASS website.
During the period in which the data were collected, the U.S. government implemented
the Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) program LDPs are loans made to farmers at harvest
at a pre-determined rate per volume of output. In subsequent months, when farmers repaid
the loan, they could do so either in full or at the prevailing market rate. LDPs thus acted
as a price floor for program commodities. To account for this policy, I specify output price
as the maximum of the loan rate or the market-year average price. The U.S. government
also provided income support to farmers in the form of Production Flexibility Contracts and
10It is straightforward to program the estimation routine in a matrix language such as Gauss. Computa-
tions take seconds to complete on a standard PC.
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Marketing Loss Assistance Payments. These payments were decoupled from output in the
sense that they were made on the basis of area under cultivation, not production of a specific
commodity. In the econometric model, I assume that these payments had no distortionary
eﬀect on production choice.
I aggregate outputs into a single category and variable inputs into capital services, labor,
energy, and materials using a multilateral Tornqvist index (see Caves et al., 1982). Since
ARMS surveys record capital assets as estimated market value at year end, I calculate capital
services adapting the methodology of Hall and Jorgenson (1969).
The estimation procedure implicitly assumes all producers have the same general pro-
duction technology (up to the type parameter). To limit possible specification bias, I focus
attention on one relatively homogenous area, the “Heartland” Farm Resource Region.11 This
region comprises the corn belt. It includes the entire states of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, as
well as portions of Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota. It
is the region with most farms, most cropland, and greatest value of production (Economic
Research Service, 2000).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data. There are a total of 5,547 observations,
where each observation corresponds to an individual farm in a single year. Without the
inclusion of lump-sum government payments, the average return to non-land inputs is about
16 percent. As displayed in Figure 2, there is considerable variation in these net revenues,
however. Although median returns are about $33 per acre, just over one third of the sample
experienced negative market returns.
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates for this sample. For each endogenous variable
(input price indices, land cultivated, and output), F tests reject at the 99 percent level the
11The USDA Economic Research Service divides the country into “Farm Resource Regions” with similar
physiographic, soil, and climatic characteristics.
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null hypothesis that excluded instruments do not have explanatory power.12 I obtain the
restricted profit function used in the theoretical model by simple algebraic manipulation of
the estimated cost function and the first-order condition for q∗.13 For the parameter estimates
in Table 2, the restricted profit function satisfies all the theoretical restrictions imposed
in Section 2. In addition, the estimated function is well-behaved, satisfying theoretical
monotonicity and curvature conditions with respect to prices.
Although model specifications and data sets diﬀer, input own-price elasticities are com-
parable to results from earlier studies of U.S. agriculture such as Ray (1982). Evaluated
at the sample mean, the estimated average annual return to land is approximately $57 per
acre, without including any federal income support payments. For the three states entirely
included in the sample (Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa), these payments averaged about $45
per acre (Environmental Working Group, 2005). Including income support payments brings
the average returns to about $102 per acre. This figure is reasonably close to the average
commercial rate of $110 per acre paid by farmers who rented land for crop production in
these three states (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2001).
As shown in the previous section, empirical calibration of the optimal contract schedule
requires two components: a restricted profit function for each type of producer and a prob-
ability distribution for type. The procedures described in this section provide precisely this
information. The estimated cost function is used to calculate ri (a, θ). The estimate σˆ3 is
used to parameterize f (θ).
12The fact that the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variables reduces the impact
of inconsistency arising from a possible weak correlation of instruments with errors (see Bound et al., 1995).
13The functional form of the corresponding restricted profit function is:





















As an illustration of the usefulness of the methodological techniques in the previous
section, I combine the parameter estimates with the theoretical results from Section 2. I
use this information to calibrate simulations of the four hypothetical policy options to retire
land in the midwestern United States. The simulations evaluate three policy decisions. The
first two decisions involve the value of policy reform. I evaluate the benefits of changing
from a single Pigouvian subsidy to a system in which the government acts as a monopsonist
employing third-degree price discrimination, i.e., using a system of linear subsidies that
vary by county. Next, I examine the benefits obtainable by shifting from a county-level
Pigouvian subsidy to the second-best program. This comparison indicates the maximum
amount the government should be willing to incur to develop an optimal policy without
collecting additional information. The final comparison calculates the value of removing
the information asymmetry. Suppose type were completely embodied in a measurable soil
quality index. By comparing of the cost of the first and second best mechanisms, we obtain
the maximum amount the government should be willing to pay to collect the soil quality
information, i.e., to change from second to first-degree price discrimination.
For the simulation, I assume all farms in a given county are the same size (equal to the
average), and all acreage is eligible for enrollment. Available land ranges from 74 to 1,150
acres per farm. County farm numbers are calculated by dividing total cropland in each
county by average farm size. The data for these calculations come from National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service (2002). Since about 5 percent of cropland in the Heartland region
participates in the CRP, I set the enrollment target at that amount (about 7 million acres).14
14Information on regional cropland and CRP participation comes from Vesterby (2002) and Economic
Research Service (2003).
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For each policy, the numerical solution of the relevant necessary conditions characterizes the
contract terms.15
Table 3 summarizes the simulation results. As discussed in Section 2, since they become
progressively less constrained the programs must be non-increasing in cost as they go from the
single Pigouvian subsidy to first-degree price discrimination. Interestingly, the only sizable
diﬀerence among the programs is between second and first-degree price discrimination. The
non-discriminatory subsidy required to attain the set-aside target is about 7.8 cents per acre,
resulting in a total cost of $558 thousand.16 Figure 3 illustrates the optimal distribution of
Pigouvian subsidies when the government can condition on observable county characteristics.
These subsidies range from 6.2 to 9.2 cents per acre, with a large plurality falling between 7.75
and 8.25 cents. Relative to a single Pigouvian subsidy, this third-degree price discrimination
allows only modest cost savings of 0.3 percent, about $1,500 per year.
Using the Baron and Myerson mechanism, the lowest the government can spend to attain
the target by using the information currently at its disposal is about $529 thousand, or 7.5
cents per acre. These savings represent about $24 thousand per year relative to the non-
discriminatory subsidy, about 4.3 percent of the total cost.
The relatively small reductions in cost obtainable by engaging in second or third degree
price discrimination contrast sharply with the first best. If the regulator could use infor-
mation on individual types to engage in first-degree price discrimination, the cost of the
program drops to about $193 thousand, or 2.7 cents per acre. The full information program
is 63.6 percent less expensive than the second best. The maximum the regulator should
15All computations are performed in GAUSS.
16One reason the payments reported here are so low is that they do not include compensation for lost lump-
sum income support payments. These payments are not private information to landowners. In principle,
therefore, the government could compensate landowners for them exactly. Such compensation would increase
the cost of the land set aside program. However, it would be oﬀset by corresponding reductions in income
support payments, resulting in no net increase in overall government expenditures.
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be willing to pay to obtain the information necessary for first-degree price discrimination is
$336.4 thousand per year.
Rather than present the contract terms for each county, as an illustration Figure 4 depicts
allocations for a second-best contract for a hypothetical county with mean characteristics.
For comparison, it also illustrates contract allocations for first-degree price discrimination
and a non-discriminatory Pigouvian subsidy, assuming all counties have identical character-
istics.
The dotted line indicates contract terms for the Pigouvian subsidy. As indicated in panel
(a), all contracts receive the same payment per acre. In panel (b), the enrollment rates by
type for the Pigouvian subsidy are not visible since they coincide with those for the first-best
contract. Enrollment decreases as type increases. This must be the case since each producer
chooses to enroll a quantity of land such that his marginal opportunity cost is equal to the
Pigouvian subsidy, and this marginal cost is increasing in type.
The solid line in both panels indicates contract terms for the first-best policy. The
fundamental diﬀerence with the Pigouvian subsidy is that the government can fully eliminate
any surplus payments. Farms with higher opportunity costs idle fewer acres. Thus, as shown
in panel (a), smaller land set asides are matched with larger payments per acre. Such an
allocation is not feasible if opportunity costs are private information since farms with lower
costs could profitably mimic higher types by choosing contracts with low enrollment and
high payments per acre.
The dashed lines depict the contract terms for the second-best policy. Panel (a) shows
that the second-best payment schedule is non-linear, oﬀering greater payments per acre
as enrollment increases. The distortionary impact of the information asymmetry on the
distribution of idled land across types can be seen in panel (b). Relative to the first best and
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Pigouvian subsidy, the allocation is shifted so that lower types enroll more land, and higher
types enroll less land. This distortion, combined with the fact that higher types receive
lower payments per acre helps reduce the incentive for lower types to falsely claim to be
high types. It is these distortions that reduce surplus payments relative to the Pigouvian
subsidy. The optimal distortion is quite small, however, resulting in cost savings that are
low in magnitude.
5 Conclusion
Recent articles have shown the usefulness of modeling type as an unobserved random
variable for analysis of regulation under asymmetric information. Here, I extend earlier
results in two directions. First, I extend the stochastic frontier literature by developing a
GMM-based methodology for estimating a stochastic cost frontier for a profit-maximizing
producer. This approach diﬀers from earlier techniques in that it easily accommodates a
system of equations (in this case a cost equation, expenditure share equations, and the ratio
of revenue to cost) and is robust to arbitrary cross-equation correlation, heteroskedasticity,
and geographic clustering. Further, it is computationally simple as it does not require non-
linear optimization.
Second, I extend the empirical contract theory literature by using the empirical results
to calibrate the theoretically optimal contract. Although the econometrician cannot directly
observe producer type, the stochastic frontier approach permits consistent estimation of the
technology and probability distribution of types in the population. This technique thus
provides the necessary ingredients for specifying an optimal contract mechanism.
Application of this methodology to a simulate a voluntary environmental program to
retire agricultural land yields some interesting results. The simulation permits comparison of
27
the costs of four hypothetical programs that vary by degree of price discrimination. This type
of analysis can provide guidance to policy makers interested in reducing the cost of voluntary
environmental policies. For example, if the second-best program closely approximates the
full-information program, reform eﬀorts may be well spent in designing a complex system
of non-linear contracts. For the sample of agricultural producers considered here, however,
such does not appear to be the case. Simulated cost advantages from using second or third
degree price discrimination are quite small. To the extent that there are diﬀerences in policy
implementation costs (not explicitly modelled here), there may be reason to use a simple
non-discriminatory policy like a uniform Pigouvian subsidy. Otherwise, the only manner of
achieving significant cost savings is to try to overcome the information problem altogether by
collecting detailed farm-specific agronomic data in an attempt to achieve first-degree price
discrimination.
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Output index (x1,000) 517.51 2,595.7
Acres 1039.2 1034.0











Cty. avg. yield 135.91 15.270
Cty. avg. population density 78.75 146.80
Number of observations 5,547
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ln Cty. avg. yield -0.4686 0.0504
ln Capital Price 0.3622 0.0029
ln Labor Price 0.1811 0.0043
ln Energy Price 0.0429 0.0026
ln Materials Price 0.4138 0.0027
ln Output 1.1264 0.0029
ln Acres -0.0807 0.0379
σ 0.8612 0.1112
R2 0.8393
Notes: Estimates robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and county clustering.
R2 for cost equation only.
Table 3: Simulation Results



























Figure 4: Regional First Best, Second Best, and Pigouvian Allocations
(acres per type) 
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